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Injunctive Protection of Personal Interests-
A Factual Approach
DALE E. BENNETT*
Personal interests are often equally as important as the so-
called "property" interests, which may be measured more readily
by the pecuniary yardstick of dollars and cents. It is consider-
ably more disturbing to the man of normal sensibilities to have
his picture put in a rogues' gallery, or his daughter constantly
solicited by a persistent male, than to have the sanctity of his
vacant lot intruded upon by continuous and repeated trespasses
or by a telephone wire crossing these premises at an altitude of
twenty or thirty feet.
Consider then the much cited maxim that "Equity will not
protect purely personal rights. Rights in property are the foun-
dation of equitable relief." This canon is generally conceded to
have originated in a decision by Lord Eldon in the case of Gee v.
Pritchard,' where the court enjoined the publication of letters
written to an adopted son concerning family matters. On its facts,
the case presented a threatened invasion of a purely personal
right-the feelings of the sender who did not want her family
affairs and confidences made public. Yet Lord Eldon felt con-
strained to posit his decision on a more familiar ground, declar-
ing:
"I do not say that I am to interfere because the letters
are written in confidence, or because the publication of them
may wound the feelings of the Plaintiff; but if mischievous
effects of that kind can be apprehended in cases in which this
Court has been accustomed, on the ground of property, to
forbid publication, it would not become me to abandon the
jurisdiction which my predecessors have exercised, and re-
fuse to forbid it."2
Like a snowball, this dictum has rolled merrily along the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
2. 2 Swans. at 425, 36 Eng. Rep. at 678. (Italics supplied.)
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judicial highway, gathering additional decisions at it went;" and
only being arrested a little, here and there, by a rebuke from
some jurist who refused to subscribe to the solecism that only
property rights are entitled to protection. 4
The writer is not particularly disturbed by the fact that our
courts have seldom frankly protected personal interests directly
and avowedly of their own right. From a practical standpoint, it
is sufficient to note that the majority of courts have followed
Lord Eldon's dictum in the spirit in which it was given. A court
that will find a property right in private letters of no actual his-
torical or literary significance, will have little difficulty in lo-
cating a satisfactory property right in any case where relief is
deemed proper. Thus, in a case where a father sought to enjoin
the seduction and debauching of his daughter, the fact that she
performed services for the plaintiff (probably by filling his coffee
cup in the morning and bringing his slippers in the evening) satis-
fied the property requirement.' Having been born in an atmosphere
of technicality and subterfuge, it is not surprising that, upon arriv-
ing at maturity, this maxim should bear the characteristics and
limitations of its birth.
One may wonder why a principle, ostensibly inconsistent
with the spirit of equitable relief, and bearing the ever present
possibility of becoming a barb of injustice, has lived such a
charmed life. This is especially remarkable in view of the dis-
favor with which equity ordinarily regards the obtuse fictions
of the common law. Possibly the rule has survived because the
courts found it a very useful tool in the time-honored process of
judicial rationalization.
Prayers for injunctive relief have come from people in all
walks of life, and covering every conceivable human wrong-
3. In Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 Atl. 542 (1896), Bryan, J., quoted
from Bispham on Equity (5 ed. 1893) 584, note 2, to the effect that, "it is the
rights of property, or, rather, rights in property, that equity interfers to
protect. A party is not entitled to a writ of injunction for a matter affecting
his person"; and from Kerr on Injunctions (1889) 1-2, for the proposition
that "Injury to property, whether actual or prospective, is the foundation
upon which its jurisdiction rests."
4. In Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97, 100 (1907), Dill,
J., declared by way of dictum, "If it appeared in this case that only the
complainant's status and personal rights were thus threatened or thus in-
vaded by the action of the defendants and by the filing of the false certifi-
cate, we should hold, and without hesitation, that an individual has rights,
other than property rights, which he can enforce in a court of equity . .
5. Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 S.E. 861 (1919).
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some substantial, others distinctly frivolous. A Chicago fireman
sought to enjoin his jealous wife from following him to fires, for
the express purpose of throwing cold water on any romances he
might be tempted with, while rescuing women in nightgowns in
the course of his duties. A Boston court was asked to enjoin
one party to a spite and jealousy-marked feud from making faces
at or otherwise molesting her neighbor and erstwhile friend.7
A court at Boma, Belgian Congo, furnishes the extraordinary case
of an important negro king, of cannibalistic tendencies, who
sought to recover his amputated limb." A distracted father in
New Jersey sought to restrain a lovesick rejected suitor of his
daughter from carrying out his threat to commit suicide on the
family doorstep." In Chicago, a mother petitioned the court to
enjoin an aviation-minded father from taking their six-year old
son on airplane trips.10 From Ohio, we have the case of a former
member of the Amish Mennonite Church, who was "mited" be-
cause of his insistence on wearing rubber in his suspenders,
against Church rules, and his subsequent withdrawal from the
church. He asked the court to enjoin the Bishops and Preachers
of the Church from further "miting" or boycotting." An Iowa
husband alleged that his health was being endangered by his
wife's use of profane and abusive epithets, and that she might
take his life unless restrained. 2 A Texas court was asked to re-
strain an employer from "associating with, calling on or having
anything whatever to do with the plaintiff's wife," except as re-
lated to her duties as a part time bookkeeper.2 Early English
cases include many instances where churchmen applied to the
Chancellor for aid in suppressing witchcraft and sorcery when
6. San Antonio Express, Feb. 10, 1934. Injunction granted.
7. Pound, Cases on Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries
to Personality (2 ed. 1930) 129. Injunction granted.
8. Id. at 130. The King, being somewhat of a local power, was given
the relief sought.
9. Id. at 132. The court, in issuing the injunction, advised the ardent
lothario to seek affection elsewhere.
10. Id. at 136. Clarence Darrow, in behalf of the boy's mother, pleaded
that the boy's life was being endangered. Injunction granted.
11. Id. at 136. Plaintiff's testimony showed that, as a result of the
"miting" order, he was unable to obtain farm help, cider mills refused his
apples, and his daughter was unable to be married. Relief granted.
12. Moir v. Moir, 182 Iowa 370, 165 N.W. 1001 (1918). The court denied
relief, giving "no serious consideration" to the petitioner's claims as to im-
pairment of health, and pointing out the futility of an injunction if the wife
was really a would-be murderer.
13. Witte v. Bauderer, 255 S.W. 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). Injunction
granted.
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spiritual corrections proved ineffective. 4 Individuals also sought
relief in cases where property damage was thought to come from
supernatural sources. 15
With petitions for equitable relief taking as many forims as
there are irritating situations in life, numerous cases arise where
an injunction should be denied. The wrong may be one of tri-
fling significance, as in the case of a "nagging" wife. Again
injunctive relief may be fraught with serious practical difficul-
ties, as in the case where a husband seeks to prevent the flirta-
tions of a "will-of-the-wisp" wife. In such instances it is very
convenient and legalistically convincing to state, "Relief denied
because no property interest is involved." On the other hand,
where relief is expedient the court may fashion the necessary
property right, and the technical or unsubstantial nature of that
right is apparently of little or no importance.
This technique is subject to criticism by the legal purist. To
persons seeking "rule of thumb" certainty with those clearly de-
fined canons which are so nicely adapted to black-letter head-
notes, it will prove a source of vexation. Yet, from the standpoint
of results, the decisions have been unusually sound, and the
"property" requirement has not operated to obstruct justice.
Possibly it has served a useful function in providing a device by
which the appellate tribunal, purporting to follow the strict man-
date of stare decisis, may place a practical check on the unduly
liberal issuance of injunctions by many trial judges.1"
The writer has approached the decisions with a hope of as-
certaining those basic considerations upon which each particular
group of cases turns; and incidentally, of noting the extent to
which homage is paid to the property right concept. In cases
where an injunction is sought to protect rights which are, at
least according to the layman's understanding, primarily per-
sonal, two significant questions arise. First, the substantive law
question: Is the defendant threatening to commit a legal wrong as
distinguished from an act which is merely wrong from a moral
or polite society standpoint? The court will not enjoin an act,
the doing of which would not render the actor liable in damages
(nominal or substantial). Secondly, the procedural question:
Assuming a wrong to be threatened, is the injunction a practical
14. Martin, Archaeologia, 60 (Part II), 353 (cited in (1918) 31 Harv. L.
Rev. at 853, n. 78).
15. Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery (1918) 31
Harv. L. Rev. 834, 853.
16. In the instances Just enumerated (notes 6-13, supra) the trial court
usually granted the injunction.
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and the proper remedy? The answer to these questions is more
important than the drawing of any fine line of distinction be-
tween personal and property rights.
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS
Often a "devoted" wife seeks to enjoin an "attractive adven-
turess" from further alienation of a wayward spouse's affections.
In such a situation the Texas courts have uniformly granted re-
lief, either on the petition of a forsaken wife,17 or of a jilted hus-
band.'8 Likewise, courts in other states have occasionally sought,
by means of the injunctive process, to restrain clandestine rela-
tionships threatening to break up a home.'9 Here, the maxim that
equity will only protect property rights, has not hampered the
courts. They have found the requisite property right in the wife's
right to support, or in the husband's right to the wife's services
and society.20 Again, the right of consortium, which includes the
17. Smith v. Womack, 271 S.W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), where the
court restrained the defendant "from visiting with or accompanying B. G.
Womack [the husband], and in person, by telephone, telegraph, or writing,
or sign or symbol, from communicating with the said B. G. Womack . . ."
The decision was noted with approval in (1926) 10 Minn. L. Rev. 163; and in
(1925) 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 97 where the writer suggests that the decision
may be supported on the general principle, established in the labor cases,
that equity will restrain third persons from inducing a breach of contract.
18. Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 413, 50 S.W. 933 (1899). The
decision is slightly weakened by the fact that the petitioner was seeking a
writ of habeas corpus, and hence would have to show that the decree was
absoluteZy void, and would not be entitled to relief on a mere showing that
it was erroneous. The court, however, in refusing the writ, clearly held that
the injunction was properly issued. Accord: Witte v. Bauderer, 255 S.W. 1016
(Tex. Civ. App. 1923), noted in (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 431.
19. Hall v. Smith, 80 Misc. 85, 140 N.Y. Supp. 796 (1913), where the erring
husband filed an affidavit, on behalf of the defendant, that when he stopped
living with the plaintiff his "feeling toward her was such that there was
no affection left that anyone could possibly alienate from her." [If this had
been shown it would have precluded relief, as a cause of action for alienation
of affections requires that at least some vestige of affection remain. Servis v.
Servis, 172 N.Y. 438, 65 N.E. 270 (1902).]
In Dunham v. Dunham (1932), the Superior Court of Cook County, Illi-
nois, issued an order whereby "the erring husband and his paramour were
'enjoined to desist, and refrain from seeing, communicating, talking, asso-
ciating, and having sexual relations with each other.'" Note (1932) 23
J. Crim. L. 659.
In Soderlund v. StoZ (1937), the Nebraska court enjoined a woman from
visiting, associating with, or communicating with the plaintiff's husband.
Comment (1938) 17 Neb. L. Bull. 62.
20. Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 413, 50 S.W. 933, 937 (1899),
cited in note 18, supra. In discussing this decision Dean Pound declares, "It
is significant that the property right of the husband in the wife's services,
now thoroughly moribund for all substantial purposes, should acquire a
temporary vitality to enable the courts to secure interests of personality
which they hesitate to protect avowedly as such." Pound, Equitable Relief
Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640,
675.
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right to the sexual relationship, companionship, society and af-
fections of the other spouse, is generally considered a "property"
right.21 The Texas Supreme Court has even stated directly that
it was unnecessary to predicate relief on any property right in
such cases. 22
In Snedaker v. King, a mother of four children alleged that
the defendant, by her "alluring conduct" was causing the plain-
tiff to lose the love and affection of her husband. The plaintiff's
plight appealed strongly to the trial court, and a sweeping in-
junction was issued, restraining the attractive intermeddler from
associating with, being near to, or communicating with the way-
ward husband, or in any way interfering with the plaintiff's
peaceful efforts to regain his love and esteem. The Ohio Supreme
Court reversed the decree,2 declaring in a brief but emphatic
per curiam opinion that such an effort to regulate and control
domestic relations "is not supported by authority, warranted by
sound reason, or in the interest of good morals or public policy. 12 4
The court also stressed "the difficulty if not impossibility of such
enforcement, and the very doubtful beneficial results to be ob-
tained thereby. 22  Judge Allen, in a concurring opinion,2 6 sug-
gests that "it is difficult to see how the court can enforce the in-
junction granted herein without attaching a probation officer
permanently to both Miss Snedaker and King. '27 Judge Allen also
21. Moreland, Injunctive Control of Family Relations (1930) 18 Ky. L.
J. 207, 215; Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affections (1934) 82 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 472.
22. In the leading case of Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 413, 50
S.W. 933 (1899), Judge Henderson states, "Indeed, the interposition of courts
of equity by restraining orders is a matter of growth, and keeps pace with
advancing civilization, and courts are continually finding new subjects for
the interposition of equitable relief by writs of injunction. Formerly, it
seemed to be the rule that courts would only interfere where some property
right or interest was involved; but now it seems that the writ will be applied
to an innumerable variety of cases, in which really no property right is in-
volved." (50 S.W. at 934-935.)
23. 111 Ohio 225, 145 N.E. 15 (1924). Chief Justice Marshall argued, in
an elaborate dissent: (1) that the defendant had no standing on appeal,
since the decree "takes nothing from her except the right .to consort with
this husband and father;" (2) that the defendant "would not lightly disobey
the injunction;" (3) that the wife's rights of support and consortium are
"property rights;" and (4) that in a great number of recent cases the courts
have issued injunctions to protect "purely personal rights." (145 N.E. at
18-20.)
24. 145 N.E. at 17.
25. Ibid. (Italics supplied.) The decision is noted in (1925) 38 Harv. L.
Rev. 396; and in (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 327 with approval of the court's argu-
ment as to the practical difficulty of enforcing such decrees.
26. 145 N.E. at 17.
27. An answer to this argument is suggested by Moreland, supra note 21,
at 217, when he points out that, "A jealous wife or husband would be an
untiring agent of the court in this situation."
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declares that such an order "merely adds fuel to the flame,...
will almost inevitably make the wrongdoing more alluring to the
husband," and "would tend to defeat rather than accelerate the
reconciliation of the husband and wife."
The Snedaker v. King decision focuses attention on the real
problem in this group of cases-the practicability and social de-
sirability of attempting to enforce matrimonial harmony by in-
junction. As a matter of fact, injunctive relief is seldom sought
except in a spirit of jealous retaliation. A plaintiff who drags the
family name and reputation through the muck of sordid publicity
attending such an action, can scarcely entertain any genuine hope
for domestic rehabilitation. Such is the perversity of human na-
ture that the injunction, if granted, will almost inevitably drive
the prodigal husband away from, rather than toward, the loving
embraces of the legally victorious wife. Then too, many "do-
mestic triangles" are traceable to deep-rooted family difficulties
and incompatibilities, or to an inborn infidelity on the part of
the wayward spouse, rather than to the importunities of any par-
ticular adventuress. Though the court may say "hands off" to
the present recipient of the misdirected affections, it cannot ef-
fectively say "love your wife" to the erring spouse.
Judge Day, in a dissenting opinion in Snedaker v. King, ex-
pressed a serious doubt as to whether any actual benefit was to
be derived from such a decree as that issued by the trial court,
but thought that that was a matter for the discretion of the trial
CoUrt.
2 s
In considering that argument, let us examine the Texas case
of Witt v. Bauderer,29 where the defendant, in an open and taunt-
ing manner, had been paying undue attention to plaintiff's wife
who was employed as his part-time bookkeeper. An injunction
was issued re~training the defendant from "associating with, call-
ing on, or having anything whatever to do with plaintiff's wife,"
except as related to her duties as an employee of the defendant.
By its decree, which was affirmed on appeal, the court sought to
preserve the wife's meal ticket, and at the same time prevent the
defendant from exceeding the proper bounds of their employer-
employee relationship. The Texas court assumed an extremely
28. 111 Ohio 225, 145 N.E. 15, 22-25 (1924). Judge Day declared, "I am
constrained to the conclusion that the equitable power exists, even though
it should rarely be exercised." Judge Day's dissent was noted with ap-
proval in (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 373.
29. 255 S.W. 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), noted in (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev.
431.
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difficult if not impossible task. Even if the mandate of the in-
junction was meticulously obeyed, there was still slight proba-
bility that it would bring about plaintiff's reconciliation with the
wife who was already living separately and had filed suit for
divorce.
In such situations appellate tribunals should place a definite
check on the overly liberal tendencies of some trial courts. In
addition to the difficulty of enforcement and doubtful beneficial
results to be secured, there is a serious question as to the social
advisability of attempting to extend the range of injunctive con-
trol into the field of family relations." The problems raised by
these domestic maladjustments are of such a delicate nature that
they will only be accentuated by a public airing in court. They
can best be worked out in the closed vestibules of the home.
Where such methods fail, a divorce, though not the proverbial
happy ending, appears to be the normal and practical solution.
As Professor Chafee aptly suggests, one may "doubt the wisdom
and effectiveness of judicial interference with 'the way of a man
with a maid.' "81
Louisiana jurisprudence is fortunately free from such cases.
In the landmark case of Moulin v. Monteleone,8 2 Chief Justice
O'Niell, in a scholarly and forceful opinion, held that Louisiana
has never recognized a cause of action for alienation of affec-
tions. Other courts have recognized the evil,38 and eight states
have recently enacted statutes abolishing the common law cause
of action for alienation of affections.8 4
An analogous problem was presented in Stark v. Hamilton,"8
where a father sought to prevent the further debauching of his
minor daughter. The trial court enjoined the defendant from
30. Comment (1932) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 440.
31. Chafee, Equitable Relief against Torts (1920) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 388,
413.
32. 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1928). The social policy underlying this deci-
sion is exemplified in the Chief Justice's conclusion, "A law that would allow
the husband compensation in money for such a wrong would be revolting
to a majority of men, and might tend more to encourage blackmail than to
protect the home." (165 La. at 195.) For a recent reappraisal of Moulin v.
Monteleone, see Comment (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 204.
33. In Miller v. Levine, 130 Me. 153, 154 Atl. 174, 178 (1931) the court
declares, "such suits furnish a most convenient weapon for extortion and
the right to bring them is a constant temptation to the unscrupulous." For
a contrary view, see Brown, supra note 21.
34. Vernier, American Family Laws (Supp. 1938) 87, § 158. These states
are Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New York
and Pennsylvania.
35. 149 Ga. 227, 99 S.E. 861 (1919), noted with approval in (1919) 19 Col.
L. Rev. 413; (1920) 5 Corn. L. Q. 177. Note (1920) 29 Yale L. J. 344 suggests
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further associating or communicating with the girl, basing its
decree on the father's technical property right in her services.
In affirming the decree, the Georgia Supreme Court frankly rec-
ognized that the real injury lay in the humiliation of the father
and the damage to the family name and reputation.
The equities of a father who seeks to protect his minor
daughter from a life of shame, appear considerably stronger than
those of the average plaintiff in the alienation of affection cases.
Then too, there is more probability that the injunction, if en-
forced, will effect a return of the stray to the family fold. Even
so, such relief has seldom been granted. The acts complained of
are commonly within the express prohibition of criminal statutes,
and severe penalties are provided-for such offenses as Statutory
Rape or Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor. The well
settled maxim that "Equity will not restrain the commission of
a crime,' '36 provides a cogent basis for refusing injunctive relief.
PARAMOUR'S ASSUMPTION OF MARITAL STATUS AND NAME
In the celebrated case of Bauman v. Bauman, the plaintiff
had been living separate and apart from her husband under an
agreement providing amply for her support. The husband had
secured one of those legally invalid but socially acceptable Mexi-
can divorces and had later married defendant, Mrs. Einstein.
Plaintiff, the true Mrs. Bauman, brought an action for a declara-
tory judgment to declare the Mexican divorce a nullity, and for
an injunction to prevent the husband and Mrs. Einstein from
representing themselves as man and wife, and Mrs. Einstein from
using the name "Mrs. Charles Ludwig Bauman." The lower court
granted the full relief sought, but the Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment insofar as it enjoined the defendants from repre-
senting themselves as man and wife, and defendant Einstein from
using the name "Mrs. Charles Ludwig Bauman."3 Judge Hubbs
pointed out that the plaintiff's matrimonial status, and any prop-
that the court might well have considered the "expediency" of granting an
injunction in such cases.
Similar relief was granted in Aymar v. Roff, 3 Johns. Ch. 47 (N.Y.
1817). The decision is approved of by Moreland, supra note 21, at 220-224.
386. Moir v. Moir, 182 Iowa 370, 165 N.W. 1001 (1918) (court refused to
enjoin would-be murderer); Heber v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 64 Colo. 352,
172 Pac. 12 (1918) (court refused to enjoin the buying of stolen goods);
People v. Prouty, 262 Ill. 218, 104 N.E. 387 (1914) (decree prohibiting divorced
parties from remarrying within a year held void, in view of the fact that such
remarriage was already punishable under a criminal statute).
37. 250 N.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 819 (1929), noted in (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 477;
(1929) 14 Corn. L. Q. 501, 503.
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erty rights incidental thereto, was protected by the declaratory
judgment; that there was no claim that Mrs. Einstein was alien-
ating the husband's affections, as they were already living sepa-
rate and apart under the separation agreement; and that "In the
last analysis the only injury alleged is an injury to plaintiff's
feelings. '18 Judge Crane, dissenting, felt that the injunction was
necessary to present usurpation of plaintiff's status as "Mrs. Bau-
man.',' While dissenting, Judge O'Brien discovered an "exclu-
sive property right in a name."40
In Somberg v. Somberg,4 1 the New York Court of Appeals
followed its decision in the Bauman case with Judges Crane and
O'Brien again dissenting. The refusal to grant injunctive protec-
tion in such cases is not based entirely upon the maxim that
equity will not protect purely personal rights. It is largely predi-
cated on the idea that no substantial right of any sort is involved.
Apparently the plaintiff does not hope to regain the companion-
ship or affection of her husband, her property rights are fully
protected, and there is no real danger of confusion of identity.
She is, however, humiliated, or should we say "resentful," at
having her husband's more recent choice claim to be his lawful
wife. The New York court has held, and properly so, that such
an interest is not entitled to protection in equity. Little, except
a vindicative satisfaction to the plaintiff, is to be gained by forc-
ing the defendants to openly flaunt their illicit relationship.
Unfortunately, there has been a recent tendency to limit the
application of the Bauman decision. In Gold v. Gold,42 a lower
New York appellate tribunal held that an injunction would issue
to restrain a husband and his paramour from living together as
38. 165 N.E. at 821, 822. Judge Hubbs further declared, "Equity cannot by
injunction restrain conduct which merely injures a person's feelings and
causes mental anguish.... The law does not remedy all social evils and
moral wrongs. . . .Attempts to govern the morals of people by injunction
can only result in making ridiculous the courts which grant such decrees."
(165 N.E. at 821, 822.)
39. 165 N.E. at 822.
40. 165 N.E. at 823. Judge O'Brien also argued (p. 824) that "Pecuniary
injury to her by confusion of identity is not Improbable." Such injury appears
decidedly improbable under the facts of the principal case.
41. 263 N.Y. 1, 188 N.E. 137 (1933). Declaratory judgment was also refused,
since no fraudulent ostensible divorce had been obtained which might cast a
shadow on plaintiff's property rights. An earlier case where the New York
court refused to protect the name and status of a lawful wife was Hodecker
v. Stricker, 39 N.Y. Supp. 515 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
42. 158 Misc. 570, 287 N.Y. Supp. 217 (1936), noted In (1936) 14 N.Y.U. L. Q.
Rev. 104. The court followed Richman v. Richman, 148 Misc. 387, 266 N.Y.
Supp. 513 (1933), noted in (1934) 2 Duke B. A. J. 71, where similar relief had
been granted.
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man and wife, to restrain the feminine defendant from using the
married name, and to restrain the husband from supporting her.
The court attempted to differentiate the Bauman decision by
pointing out that in that case the husband had made no defaults
in his annual payments under the separation agreement. In the
case at bar the husband had failed to make such payments, alleg-
ing financial inability, while at the same time expending money
for the support and maintenance of the domestic usurper. From
this, the court reasoned that the true wife's right of support, a
property right, was affected.
The causal connection between the wife's loss of adequate
support and the use of her married name (which the court en-
joined) is not very clear. Even the part of the decree enjoining
the husband from supporting the other woman was hardly neces-
sary. Without any special injunctive mandate, a husband may be
punished for failure to support his lawful wife, and will not be
permitted to plead inability to pay if it can be shown that he is
"keeping" another woman. That the purported distinction was
really an effort to evade and limit the rule laid down by the Court
of Appeals, is evident from several statements in the court's opin-
ion 4 which are directly in accord with the reasoning of the dis-
senting judges in the Bauman case.
Again, as in the alienation of affection cases, it is not a ques-
tion of finding a property right. It is a question of the social de-
sirability of granting injunctive relief to salve the injured feel-
ings or placate the vindictive spirit of the lawful wife. Viewed
in its most favorable light, the interest to be protected appears
rather inconsequential.
A similar wrong was involved in Burns v. Stephens,44 where
a Michigan court enjoined a woman, with whom the plaintiff
had lived illicitly for several years, from assuming his name and
representing to friends and associates that she was his common-
law wife. Dissenting Judge Snow very properly argued that the
43. Judge Schenck stated that although the defendant was not attempting
to impersonate plaintiff, she had, by her representations that she was Mrs.
Gold, "usurped a legal status which belongs exclusively to the plaintiff." As
to the representations that Gold had obtained a divorce and married the de-
fendant, the court declared, "May not such representations be the basis for
injury to reputation as well as injury to feelings? Is not such representation
a reflection upon the moral character of this plaintiff? I think so, and unless
the injunctive relief prayed for is afforded the plaintiff she has no remedy."
(287 N.Y. Supp. at 220.) Query-Did the representations cast any seriou.,
reflections upon the character or reputation of the lawful wife?
44. 236 Mich. 443, 210 N.W. 482 (1926), criticized in Note (1927) 26 Mich.
L. Rev. 111. Judge Snow's dissent was concurred in by two other judges.
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plaintiff, in seeking to escape the entanglement of his prior im-
proper relation, when he became more enamored of another
woman, "does not come into equity with clean hands." However,
where plaintiff is not precluded by his own moral turpitude, there
is no good reason for refusing injunctive relief in a jurisdiction
where a declaratory judgment is not available.45 Likewise, equit-
able relief has been granted where a wife sought, by means of a
fraudulently procured birth certificate, to establish her adul-
terous offspring as a child of the plaintiff. 46 In these cases the
court experienced no difficulty in finding a very substantial prop-
erty right. The possibilities that the plaintiff may be called upon
to support the alleged wife or child, and that such parties may
ultimately claim the plaintiff's property as against his lawful
heirs, make it important to have the pretender's rights deter-
mined while competent evidence is obtainable. In the background
lurked important personal rights-the plaintiff did not want an
adventuress posing as his wife; or a wife's illegitimate child
paraded as his son.47 Assuming the availability of a declaratory
judgment 47 a to establish the legal invalidity of the pretended re-
lationship, the personal right asserted in these cases appears more
substantial than that of the wife in the Bauman case.
SHADOWING AND OTHER FORMS OF PERSECUTION
In Chappell v. Stewart" a plaintiff sought to enjoin open
shadowing by private detectives, alleging that this conduct
caused him great inconvenience and annoyance, interfered with
his social intercourse and his business, and caused grave suspi-
cions to be entertained about him, so as to greatly damage his
financial credit. Judge Bryan held that the plaintiff's bill, "as-
suming all its allegations were true, did not contain any matter
cognizable in equity ...." He based his decision on the maxim that
"Injury to property, whether actual or prospective, is the foun-
45. Randazzo v. Roppolo, 105 N.Y. Supp. 481 (Sup. Ct. 1906). The defendant
had gone through the form of a marriage ceremony with a man impersonat-
ing plaintiff, and had filed a certificate of marriage with the bureau of vital
statistics. Injunctive relief was granted.
46. Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910 67 Atl. 97 (1907), noted In
(1907) 7 Col. L. Rev. 533; (1907) 21 Harv. L. Rev. 54.
47. See dictum by Dill, J., in Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 910, 67
Atl. 97, 100 (1907), supra note 4.
47a. The movement for adoption of declaratory judgment statutes has
been active In the United States since 1921 when the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act was proposed. For a list of states adopting the Uniform Act
see 9 Uniform Acts Annotated (Supp. 1938) 50, and Borchard, Declaratory
Judgments (1934) 631-650. Even so, Louisiana and a number of other states
have not enacted such a statute.
48. 82 Md. 323, 33 Atl. 542 (1896).
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dation on which its [Equity's] jurisdiction rests." Assuming, as
he did, that plaintiff's allegations were true, the court might have
found a very substantial property right in the injury-to plain-
tiff's business and financial credit. The decision, however, may
have been largely influenced by a belief that the acts complained
of constituted only a moral wrong. Probably, where "open
shadowing" is recognized as an actionable wrong, 9 injunctive re-
lief will be granted.
Occasionally unmarried girls seek equitable protection from
the persistent and annoying attentions of rejected suitors. The
cause presented in the Texas case of Hawks v. Yancey,5" should
appeal to any court. The plaintiff, a nurse, had been living in
adultery with the defendant, a married physician, for approxi-
mately six years. When she sought to terminate the illicit rela-
tion, the defendant objected and began a campaign of continuous
persecution. He made a complete revelation of her past shame to
her fiance, an upright young man; thus causing him to break off
their engagement. By false charges of attempted blackmail, he
caused her to be arrested, and caused her discharge from the
sanitarium where she was employed and from the Nurses' Asso-
ciation. All the while, the defendant was attempting to force his
unwelcome attentions upon the plaintiff at every opportunity.
Finding the damage was clear and the legal remedy inadequate,
the court held that an injunction should issue. It made no effort
to predicate relief upon the usual property right, although an in-
jury to such an interest could easily have been found in the facts
that the plaintiff had lost her job, had been expelled from her
professional organization, and had lost an opportunity to marry.
Judge Looney declared that "personal rights of citizens are in-
finitely more sacred, and by every test are of more value than
things that are measured in dollars and cents."51
49. Schultz v. Frankfort Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913), noted
in (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 658.
50. 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), noted in (1925) 19 I1. L. Rev. 679.
51. 265 S.W. at 237. It has often been suggested that the extreme liber-
ality of the Texas courts in these personal relations cases is due to a broad
wording of the Texas injunction statute. Notes (1934) 2 Duke B. A. J. 71, 72;
(1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 373, 374; (1920) 5 Corn. L. Q. 177, 181; and others. This
suggestion Is justified by certain language in the Texas cases.
In 1922 the Texas Commission of Appeals definitely held that the Texas
injunction statute was intended as a codification or restatement of general
equity principles, subject to the self imposed limitations of the common law.
Hill v. Brown, 237 S.W. 252 (Tex. Com. App. 1922), discussed by Professor
McCormick, Will an Injunction be Granted in Texas when a Legal Remedy is
Adequate? (1922) 1 Tex. L. Rev. 43. That this clarification will not alter the
ultra-liberal attitude of the Texas courts in these family relation cases, is indi-
cated by Judge Looney's declaration in Hawk8 v. Yancey that "The rule that
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Whether in the name of a "property right," or by a frank
acknowledgment of a "right of privacy, '" 2 courts should uniform-
ly grant relief in such cases. Certainly a girl should have a right
to protection from persecution and continued annoyances by a
rejected suitor. Enforcement presents no serious problem in such
cases. The plaintiff will keep the court informed as to violations.
The remedy at law, by civil suits and criminal prosecution, holds
forth a very hollow promise of relief to the beleaguered female.
Even where the annoyances stop short of the systematic coercion
employed by the defendant in Hawks v. Yancey, it may be quite
disturbing and injurious to a girl of normal sensibilities. 3
Similarly, the court, in an extreme case, has enjoined a wife
from continually harassing and embarrassing her husband, pend-
ing a suit to establish the invalidity of their marriage." But,
where the conduct complained of merely amounted to what is
commonly known and understood as "nagging," relief was re-
fused.55 Sometimes, where the plaintiff seeks to enjoin continual
equity will not afford by injunction except where property rights are involved
is known chiefly by its breach rather than its observance; in fact, it may be
regarded as a fiction, because courts with greatest uniformity have based their
jurisdiction to protect purely personal rights nominally on an alleged property
right. . . ." (265 S.W. at 237.) He makes it clear that, on general prinoiples
of equity, an injunction should issue to prevent further persecution of the
plaintiff. Even a complete re-incarnation of the property right requirement,
would not necessarily result in a refusal to grant relief. The Texas courts
have shown a willingness to tread with abandon in the delicate zone of
family relations, and are not likely to beat a hasty retreat from that field.
They can always find a property right where they deem the granting of relief
desirable and practical.
52. The idea that an individual has a "right of privacy" or "right to be
let alone" is generally conceded to have originated in a much cited article
by Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
53. Sullivan, Novel Uses of the Writ of Injunction (1902) 64 Albany L. J.
46, 47, interestingly describes an Ohio case: "A certain young lady, an elocu-
tionist and reader, of Toledo, Ohio, has been greatly annoyed of late by the
attentions of a certain well-known lawyer and politician of that city. He
seizes upon every opportunity of pouring into her ear his tale of love. And,
while no doubt, she was pleased with the first installments, she has sickened
of his wearisome repetitions. After trying both entreaties and threats, she,
as a last resort, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which has enjoined
her persistent admirer from further advances .... Time and again has the
writ of injunction protected the weak suffering from the aggressions of the
rich and powerful, and today, at the beginning of the 20th Century, bachelor
girls invoke its powerful aid to shield them from annoying attentions of un-
desirable suitors."
54. Blanton v. Blanton, 163 Ga. 361, 136 S.E. 141 (1926). The Court found
a property right in the facts that defendant was always demanding money
(the evidence did not indicate that she ever received any), was interfering
with plaintiff's personal effects by taking charge of his hotel room, and was
jeopardizing his position with the railroad by applying for numerous passes.
Defendant would also appear late at night and wake up the other guests in
the hotel where plaintiff stayed by hammering on his door.
55. Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920), noted in (1920)
1939] PROTECTION OF PERSONAL INTERESTS 679
acts of abuse, a criminal prosecution for disturbance of the public
peace provides an effective and adequate remedy. In such situa-
tion the courts are reluctant to issue an injunction."
PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE LETTERS
In Pope v. Curl,57 decided in 1741, Lord Hardwicke enjoined
the unauthorized publication of private letters of the celebrated
author, Alexander Pope. In answer to an objection by defend-
ant's counsel that a letter was in the nature of a gift to the
receiver, the Lord Chancellor declared, "It is only a special prop-
erty in the receiver, possibly the property of the paper may
belong to him; but this does not give a license to any person
whatsoever to publish them to the world." The letters of Alex-
ander Pope, though written concerning purely personal matters,
might have been found to have more than ordinary literary value,
but the decision does not appear to have been based upon their
4 Minn. L. Rev. 538. The parties had been separated for some time, but
the wife was continuing her campaign of abuse by going to plaintiff's
office and hurling false accusations at him, and by creating a scene when-
ever she met him on the street or at church. Brown, J., declared that the
court would not grant relief in such actions, which would involve "dragging
into court for judicial investigation at the suit of a peevish, fault-finding
husband, or at the suit of a nagging, ill-tempered wife, matters of no serious
moment, which if permitted to slumber in the home closet would silently be
forgotten or forgiven." (177 N.W. at 625.)
It is doubtful whether the matters involved in the principal case would
"slumber in the home closet" or were likely to "be forgotten or forgiven,"
since the acts complained of went beyond the bounds of mere "nagging."
However, a criminal prosecution for disturbance of the public peace would
probably prove an effective and adequate deterrent.
56. In Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920) (note 55, supra)
it would appear that a peace bond, secured in the local criminal court, would
be the proper remedy. In Ashinsky v. Levenson, 256 Pa. 14, 100 AtI. 491, 493
(1917), the court stressed the adequacy of the plaintiff's legal remedy, and
refused to enjoin a member of a religious denomination from molesting the
pastor near the house of worship or upon the public streets. But see dictum
in Williams v. O'Shaughnessy, 172 N.Y. Supp. 574, 575 (Sup. Ct. 1918), to the
effect that an injunction will lie to restrain the continuous sending of letters,
if written solely for the purpose of annoyance. The dictum is criticized in
Note (1919) 19 Col. L. Rev. 163.
Cf. Reed v. Carter, 268 Ky. 1, 103 S.W. (2d) 663 (1937), where the court en-
joined the plaintiff's sister from molesting her when she visited their 90-
year old mother who lived with defendant. There the plaintiff's "natural
right" to visit her mother was "fortified by a written contract" wherein it
was expressly provided that the plaintiff would have the privilege of visiting
her mother without molestation or annoyance. The decision has been criti-
cized in Note (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 166, on the ground that "To determine
what conduct would constitute a violation of the present decree . . .may
well involve the court in endless difficulties."
57. 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (1741). Accord: Thompson v. Stanhope,
Ambler 737, 27 Eng. Rep. 476 (1774), where the publication of letters of Lord
Chesterfield was enjoined.
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distinctive character. Subsequently, in Gee v. Pritchard8 Lord
Eldon enjoined the publication of purely personal letters which
did not have even the slightest literary qualities. Thus the gen-
eral proposition became firmly entrenched in English law that
where a person sent a letter it was a gift of the paper and ink to
the receiver, but the sender retained a literary property right
in his composition and the receiver could not publish the letter to
the world.
This highly technical method of preserving the sender's
"right of privacy" has been uniformly followed by American
courts. The earliest recorded decision in this country was that
by the Louisiana court in Dennis v. Leclerc5 where the court
enjoined the publication of casual personal letters, written by a
lawyer. The court cited instances in both French and Roman
law where a letter was treated as "property," and followed the
English case of Pope v. Curl for the proposition that the sender
of a letter retains a property interest in it and can enjoin its
publication, even though the letter has no particular literary
value. That the court, in these cases, is really protecting per-
sonal rights, 0 and that there is a substantial need for such pro-
tection, is clearly shown in the opinion.6"
In the leading case of Woolsey v. Judd6 2 the New York court
decided that it would, in all cases, enjoin the unauthorized publi-
cation of private letters, and that the letters need have no real
58. 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818), discussed more fully at note 1,
supra.
59. 1 Mart. (O.S.) 297, 5 Am. Dec. 712 (La. 1811). In Schwartz v. Edring-
ton, 133 La. 235, 62 So. 660 (1913), the court cited and followed Dennis v.
Leclerc in enjoining the publication of a signed petition where plaintiff's sig-
nature had been fradulently obtained.
60. Pound, supra note 20, at 671. After pointing out situations where relief
is granted, Dean Pound remarks: "Here, as we shall see presently, courts of
equity generally insist upon some shadow of a property interest, however
trivial; actually protecting the feelings but purporting to protect only the
pocketbook."
61. The court poignantly remarks: "A brother may correspond with his
brother, and grieve with him on the distresses of the family, occasioned by
the misconduct of their father, and devise the means of alleviating the con-
sequences of it. With secrecy he may succeed: but if a gazetter, in whose
hands accident or knavery may place his letter, cannot be compelled to
respect the privacy of these family secrets, the writer will innocently incur
the odium of the conduct of the younger son of Noah.
"An injured wife may commit to paper, for the information of a parent,
the cause of family disquietude; if the dishonest holder of a press may give
publicity to the complaint, adieu to all her hopes of domestic felicity.
"If a father remonstrate with a daughter on the errors of her conduct,
the remedy which parental fondness and solicitude had prepared, may, by
the touch of a knavish printer, be turned into a deadly poison." (1 Mart.
(O.S.) at 314.)
62. 4 Duer 379 (N.Y. 1855).
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literary or pecuniary value. 68 Again, as in Dennis v. Leclerc, the
court felt bound to posit relief upon the property right which the
sender has in "the products of his own labor," at the same time
stressing the "mischievous consequences" that would result from
allowing such publications.
The Massachusetts court has apparently accorded full and
unqualified recognition to the "property interest" of the sender
of private letters. In Baker v. Libbie 4 the executor of Mary
Baker Eddy's estate was granted an injunction to prevent the
publication of letters written by the deceased to kinswomen con-
cerning ordinary and personal subjects such as health and house-
hold matters. The decision was based on the theory that Mrs.
Eddy retained a real property interest in her correspondence,
which passed, as an asset, to her estate.65 The personal right of
privacy, where recognized, has been held to terminate with the
death of the person whose right is invaded.66
The recognition of a divided property in letters raises several
questions as to the respective rights of the sender and the re-
ceiver. One court held that the author was not entitled to re-
cover physical possession of his letters, the letters being likened
"to separate jewels" belonging to the recipient. 7 It also held that
although the one receiving private letters may not in any way
"multiply copies," she may read them to her friends.""
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Modern science has produced the candid camera; modern
journalism, the tabloid; and modern business, large scale adver-
63. The court rejected the distinction drawn in Wetmore v. Scovell, 3
Edw. Ch. 515 (Hoff. N.Y. 1842), and Hoyt v. MacKenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. 320, 49
Am. Dec. 178 (N.Y. 1848), where it had been held that an injunction would
not issue unless the letters had a real value as literary compositions.
64. 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912), noted in (1926) 12 Va. IL. Rev. 656.
See also Dennis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart. (O.S.) 297, 302 (La. 1811).
65. Rugg, C.J., declares that the property of the sender of private letters
"is as plain as property in the game of the hunter or in the grain of the
husbandman." He also states, "This case does not involve personal feelings
or what has been termed the right of privacy." (97 N.E. at 111, 112.)
66. See note 72, infra.
.67. Grigsby v. Breckenridge, 65 Ky. 480, 92 Am. Dec. 509 (1867). The court
enjoined the publication of letters written by plaintiff to his wife, and given
on her death bed to defendant; but refused to allow their physical recovery.
Williams, J., (dissenting) argued that the wife received only a life interest in
the letters, and that on her death they became once more the entire property
of the author.
68. Williams, J., (dissenting) argues that any public reading of a letter
amounts to a publication and is not permitted. Certainly a reading in a
crowded auditorium would not "multiply copies," but might be very harmful.
What would Judge Williams say of the case where a girl receiving a love
letter reads it to her room-mate?
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tising. These recent developments have led to an exploitation,
by a too enterprising press and commercial interests, of the beau-
ty, name or peculiarities of private individuals. A society matron
may come upon her picture in a scurrilous week-end magazine
section, on the same page as that of a burlesque queen. A beau-
tiful girl may discover her picture enhancing the attractiveness
of an advertisement for patent medicine containing vitamins A to
D. An outstanding athlete or a prominent political figure may
find his name linked with some breakfast food or five cent cigar.
A parent may find a picture of his malformed child in a widely
read publication.
Whether the aggrieved individual is seeking damages or an
injunction to restrain further publication, the question presented
is essentially the same. Should the court recognize a relatively
new interest-the right of privacy? This interest has been var-
iously defined as "freedom from uncalled for and undesired pub-
licity,"69 as "the right to be let alone,"7" and as immunity afforded
against the use of one's personality "to feed a prurient curios-
ity."11 It had already received incognito protection in the private
letter cases.
The decisions pior to 1902 were indicative, but not authori-
tative. In those denying relief, the only point necessarily decided
was that a person's reputation did not, on his death, pass to his
widow or surviving relatives in such a manner that they could
sue to protect it.72 Where relief was granted, it was on the basis
69. Note (1938) 27 Calif. L. Rev. 84.
70. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (4 ed. 1932) 442.
71. Note (1926) 12 Va. L. Rev. 656.
72. In Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed. 280, 31 L.R.A. 283 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894),
the court refused, on petition of the widow and children, to enjoin publication
of a true biography of Corliss, the inventor; it stressed the idea that the
deceased was a "public man" and had surrendered his right of privacy. In
Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899), noted
In (1900) 13 Harv. L. Rev. 415, the court refused to enjoin the use of the
name and portrait of Col. John Atkinson, a well known lawyer and politician,
on a cigar label. The action was by the widow, but the court distinctly held
that "Colonel John Atkinson would himself be remediless, were he alive." In
Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895), the court refused to enjoin
the exhibition, at the Columbia Exposition of a statue of Mrs. Schuyler en-
titled, "woman as a philanthropist." The court based its decision on two
grounds, (1) that "Whatever right of privacy Mrs. Scuhyler had died with
her," and (2) that the plaintiff's cause of action was "wholly fanciful" in view
of the respectful and honorable purpose of the statue. Murray v. Gast Litho-
graphic & Engraving Co., 8 Misc. 36, 28 N.Y. Supp. 271 (1894) held that a
parent could not enjoin or recover damages for the publication of a portrait
of his infant child.
[Vol. I
1939] PROTECTION OF PERSONAL INTERESTS 683
of an implied contract or breach of confidence.7 3 However, the issue
was squarely presented in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Company;74 and the New York Court of Appeals, by a 4-3 deci-
sion, refused relief, by way of either damages or an injunction, to
a beautiful girl whose photograph had been conspicuously used
as part of an advertisement for flour. In speaking of the right of
privacy, Chief Justice Parker declared, "Mention of such right is
not to be found in Blackstone, Kent, or any other of the great com-
mentators upon the law . . ." and he expressed a fear that the
recognition of such a right would open up a "vast field of liti-
gation." 75
The New York Civil Rights Law
As a result of a popular disapproval of this decision, and in
response to a suggestion contained therein, the New York Legis-
lature enacted sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law of
1903.7" This statute prohibited the unauthorized use of the name,
portrait, or picture of any living person "for advertising pur-
poses, or for the purposes of trade," and expressly provided that
the aggrieved individual would be entitled to an injunction as
well as damages.
The courts have had little difficulty in determining what con-
stitutes a use for advertising purposes. Thus, an injunction has
been issued to prevent the use of the name of the president emer-
itus of a great university, in connection with a set of books;77 to
prevent the use of a stage actress's picture on a poster advertising
a photoplay;78 and to restrain a street car company from using
the picture of a lady and her six-year old son as an illustration
of the proper way to enter a car.7 9
73. Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888), where a photog-
rapher was enjoined from exhibiting or selling copies of a lady's photograph,
on the ground that such publication constituted a breach of contract and of
trust. Cf. Dockrell v. Dougal, 78 Law Times Rep. 840 (1898), affirmed 80 Law
Times Rep. 556 (1899), noted in (1898) 12 Harv. L. Rev. 207, where the court
refused to restrain the unauthorized use of the name of a physician and
lecturer, as endorsing a patent medicine.
74. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
75. 64 N.E. at 443.
76. N.Y. Laws 1903, c. 132, § 2; Cahill's Consol. Laws of N.Y., 1930, c. 7,
H 50/,51.
77. Elliot v. Jones, 66 Misc. 95, 120 N.Y. Supp. 989 (1910).
78. Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing Co., 192 App. Div. 251, 182 N.Y.
Supp. 428 (1920).
79. Almind v. Sea Beach Ry. Co., 157 App. Div. 230, 141 N.Y. Supp. 842
(1913). In answer to the defendant's argument that it expected no pecuniary
return from the use of the photograph, Thomas, J., declared, "No cause is so
alluring that it may allure by exposing the portrait of a person to the public
gaze. The statute does not mean that the grocer may not without consent
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In determining what constitutes use for purposes of trade,
the New York courts have held that the use of a name or photo-
graph in connection with a legitimate news item in the daily
paper 0 or the news reel81 is not actionable. It was not the pur-
pose of the statute to stifle the true portrayal of current events.
Beyond that the moving picture industry may not go. In Binns v.
Vitagraph Co.8 2 the defendant had produced a fictitious film based
upon the actions of plaintiff, a present national hero. The court
held that he was entitled to damages and an injunction to pre-.
vent the use of his name for purposes of trade. Likewise, a street
vendor has been granted relief, where a photographer had sin-
gled him out and taken his picture as part of a fictionalized film
of New York street scenes.18 Such decisions appear in accord
with the spirit and purpose of the New York statute. It is not
asking too much to require the producer to secure the consent of
the subject before incorporating his name or picture in a film.
On the other hand, relief was denied in the case of Colyer
v. Fox Publishing Company5 ' to a professional diver whose pic-
ture had been published in "The National Police Gazette" on a
page with four vaudeville performers. Under the pictures were
the following words, "Five of a kind on this page. Most of them
adorn the burlesque stage; all of them are favorites with the
bald-headed boys." Other decisions have shown a like tendency
to limit the statute by a strict construction. Relief was refused
where, in a picture depicting the life of those engaged in the
white slave traffic, the plaintiff's factory was shown with his
name thereon. 5 A plaintiff was held to have no cause of action
for violation of the Civil Rights Law where the defendant had
published a newspaper article, purporting to have been written
by plaintiff concerning sensational and absurd adventures in Af-
use another's picture to advertise his goods but that a reformer may without
such consent expose it to call attention to ways and means of reformation."
80. Moser v. Press Pub. Co., 59 Misc. 78, 109 N.Y. Supp. 963 (1908). In
Jeffries v. N. Y. Evening Journal Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 570, 124 N.Y. Supp.
781 (1910), the court refused to enjoin the publication of a biography.
81. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N.Y.
Supp. 752 (1919), noted in (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 100.
82. 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913), noted in (1913) 62 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
656, (1912) 21 Yale L. J. 526.
83. Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y. Supp.
800 (1932), affirmed, 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 713 (1933). The decision is noted
with approval in (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 1081.
84. 162 App. Dlv. 297, 146 N.Y. Supp. 999 (1914).
85. Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N.Y.
Supp. 829 (1915).
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rica.1 Again, where the photograph of plaintiff, a Hindu musi-
cian, had been used to illustrate a newspaper article on "The
Famous Hindu Rope Trick," the court declared that the article
was educational and not within the purview of the statute. 7 In
another case, the court held that the use of plaintiff's name, at
a single place in a book to lend "local color," was not actionable."8
All of the above cases presented situations where the court might
well have held the statute applicable.
Originally of limited scope, the New York Civil Rights Law
has not added to its stature as it ran the gamut of judicial inter-
pretation. It has served as a basis for the granting of relief in
many cases, but in an almost equal number of situations it has
failed to provide protection from those interests which seek to
capitalize on the personalities and peculiarities of private indi-
viduals.89 Complete security can best be afforded by the more
flexible method of liberal judicial decisions.
Judicial Recognition-Unauthorized Use of Name or Photograph
for Advertising Purposes
Brandeis and Warren pointed the way to judicial protection
in an article, The Right of Privacy, published in 1890.10 They ar-
gued that in the private letter cases the courts, though stressing
a technical property right, were really enforcing "the more gen-
eral right of the individual to be let alone"; and that it was
necessary and desirable to prevent the invasion of this right by
the photographer or the press.
Some courts have continued to follow the anachronistic ap-
proach of the Roberson case, and have refused to protect the
86. D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Company, 208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101
(1913).
87. Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup.
Ct. 1937). The court attempted to distinguish the Binns and Blumenthal
decisions (notes 82 and 83, supra) on the ground that emphasis was placed
in those cases on "dramatization rather than information." The fact that pro-
fessional actors posed for some of the pictures in the principal case did not
bother the court.
88. Damron v. Doubleday Doran & Co., 133 Misc. 302, 231 N.Y. Supp. 444
(1928), noted in (1928) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 709; (1928) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 968;
(1928) 7 N. C. L. Rev. 435.
89. For a complete summary of the judicial experiences of the New York
statute, see Kacedan, The Right of Privacy (1932) 12 B. U. L. Rev. 600, 625-644.
90. Brandeis and Warren, supra note 52. The article was written in ap-
proval of the unreported decision in Manola v. Stevens, N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890.
(New York Times, June 15, 18, 21, 1890.) In that case an unauthorized flash-
light picture had been taken of plaintiff, a popular actress, who was playing
in a Broadway theatre in a role requiring tights. A preliminary injunction
granted ex-parte, restraining the use of this photograph, was made permanent
when the defendant failed to appear.
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right of privacy because no such interest was recognized by the
early common law authorities.9 1 In a few cases, the courts granted
relief, but chose to base their decisions upon an extremely sha-
dowy property right, 2 or upon a threatened breach of contract.9
On the whole, however, subsequent decisions have shown a re-
markable willingness to accept and apply the logic of these pio-
neer writers.
The first complete judicial recognition of the recently discov-
ered right of privacy came in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co.,94 where the Georgia court unanimously held that an indi-
vidual could enjoin a photographer and an insurance company
from the unauthorized use of his photograph for advertising pur-
poses. Judge Cobb relied on the article by Brandeis and Warren
and quoted with approval from Judge Gray's able dissent in the
Roberson case. He pointed out that the individual's right "to be
let alone" was recognized in the ancient Roman law. Thus, the
right of privacy was not a new right, but merely the adaptation
of an old concept to the new problems created by modern scien-
tific and economic development.
Four other jurisdictions have followed the way thus charted,
and have held that the unauthorized use of one's photograph for
advertising purposes constituted an actionable invasion of his
91. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 AtI. 97 (1909); Vassar College
V. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (D.C. Mo. 1912), noted in (1912) 61 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 129. In Christian Hospital v. People, 223 Ill. 224, 79 N.E. 72
(1906), the court confused the right of privacy with the more limited right of
reputation and applied the rule that "equity will not restrain a libel."
92. Edison v. Edison Polyform Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (1907),
where the court enjoined the unauthorized use of Thomas A. Edison's name,
picture and endorsement on a patent medicine.
93. McCreery v. Miller's Groceries Co., 99 Colo. 499, 64 P. (2d) 803 (1937),
noted in (1938) 16 Tex. L. Rev. 263, where the court enjoined the use of
plaintiff's photograph in advertising coffee. The court stressed the idea that
the photographs were secured by inducing the photographer to breach his
implied and express contract not to display them. Three judges dissented,
denying the existence of any "right of privacy."
94. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). Judge Cobb declared, "So thoroughly
satisfied are we that the law recognizes, within proper limits, as a legal right,
the right of privacy, and that the publication of one's picture without his
consent by another as an advertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing
the profits and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this right, that we
venture to predict that the day will come that the American bar will marvel
that a contrary view was ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability,
just as in the present day we stand amazed . . . that Lord Hale, with perfect
composure of manner and complete satisfaction of soul, imposed the death
penalty for witchcraft upon ignorant and harmless women." (50 S.E. at 80-81.)
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right of privacy. In Kunz v. Allen 5 the Kansas court enjoined the
unauthorized use of plaintiff's picture in an advertising motion
picture short. In Munden v. Harris6 the Missouri court gave
damages for the use of a child's picture in connection with a jew-
elry store advertisement. Judge Ellison treated the individual's
exclusive right to his picture as a property right and concluded
that where this right is invaded "he may have his remedy, either
by restraint in equity or damages in an action at law."9 The
North Carolina court, in the recent case of Flake v. Greensboro
News Co.,98 allowed damages for the accidental use of a radio en-
tertainer's picture in a joint advertisement for bread and a bur-
lesque-type stage "revue." No injunction was sought, since the
use had been discontinued. The decision is significant, in that the
cause of action sustained was based squarely upon the violation
of the plaintiff's "right of privacy." 9  Similarly, the Kentucky
court held that the use of a sketch and forged testimonial of a
prominent gentleman, in connection with an advertisement for
liver pills, was an actionable invasion of his right of privacy.10
Once the court recognizes the existence of a legal right of
privacy, little difficulty will be encountered in securing injunc-
tive relief. Even where the plaintiff is motivated solely by the
personal desire "to be let alone," the court may readily discover
a satisfactory property interest. The Missouri court aptly suggests,
"If there is a value in it, sufficient to excite the cupidity of an-
95. 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918), noted in (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 269. The
court did not choose between the theory of the Pavesich case (supra note 94)
that the right of privacy was primarily a "personal right," and that of Mun-
den v. Harris (infra note 96) that it was "a property right of material profit."
96. 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911). Ellison, J., vigorously attacked
the Roberson decision, where an injunction and damages were refused on the
ground that the beauteous plaintiff had no property right in her likeness, de-
claring, "It must strike the most obtuse that a claim of exclusive right to
one's picture is a just claim.. . . One may have a peculiarity of appearance,
and if it is to be made a matter of merchandise, why should it not be for
his benefit?" (134 S.W. at 1078.)
97. 134 S.W. at 1079.
98. 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938), noted in (1938) 27 Calif. L. Rev. 84.
Accompanying the picture was the statement, "Keep that Sylph-Like Figure
by eating more of Melt's Rye and Whole Wheat Bread says Mlle. Sally Payne,
exotic red haired Venus." (Defendants had mistakenly used plaintiff's picture
in place of that of Sally Payne, the leading lady of the "revue.")
99. The court held that no cause of action was stated for libel since the
words were not libelous per se and special damages were not alleged; but held
that plaintiff had stated a cause of action for the invasion of her right of
privacy. Barnhill, J., quoted at length (195 S.E. at 63) from Judge Gray's
dissent In the Roberson case.
100. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909). The
Pavesich case was cited.
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other, why is it not the property of him who gives it value and
from whom the value springs?"'01
Extensions of Judicial Protection
Commercial advertisers are not the only ones who threaten
the individual's right of privacy. The Washington court, in State
v. Hinkle,'0 2 restrained a state political party from using the
name of Senator La Follette.
Occasionally the court has been called upon to protect par-
ties, accused but not convicted of crime, from the over-zealous
efforts of police officials. It is customary and expedient for those
charged with law enforcement to photograph, measure and fin-
gerprint, so as to preserve the identity of those convicted of
crime. 103 The taking of such photographs and measurements in
advance of conviction may sometimes be necesary for identifica-
tion of a prisoner, 10 4 or for the apprehension and re-arrest of an
accused person who is likely to escape or "jump bail" before
trial.10 5 There is no justification, however, for the indiscriminate
photographing and measuring of all parties accused of crime. In
the companion cases of Itzkovitch v. Whitaker' and Schulman v.
Whitaker,0 7 decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the plain-
tiffs had been arrested on charges of operating their pawnshops
as "fences" for receiving stolen goods, had pleaded "not guilty,"
and had been released on bond. Although they had previously
been apprehended a number of times, they had never been con-
101. Ellison, J., in Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078
(1911), cited in note 96, supra.
102. 131 Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317 (1924). Bridges, J., declares "Nothing so
exclusively belongs to a man or is so personal and valuable to him as his
name. His reputation and the character he has built are inseparably con-
nected with it. Others can have no right to use it without his express con-
sent, and he has a right to go into any court at any time to enjoin or pro-
hibit any unauthorized use of it. Nor is It necessary to prove that the unau-
thorized use will damage him. This the law will presume." (229 Pac. at 319.)
Cf. Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911), where the
publication of plaintiff's photograph in connection with a newspaper article
concerning her father who was accused of crime was held not actionable.
103. In re Molineux, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727 (1904); Hodgeman v. Olsen,
86 Wash. 615, 150 Pac. 1122 (1915).
104. Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 117 S.W. 746 (1909), 92 Ark. 81, 122
S.W. 115 (1909); Bartletta v. McFeely, 107 N.J. Eq. 141, 152 AtI. 17 (1930),
noted in (1931) 11 B. U. L. Rev. 289 where the writer points out that the case
went further than most jurisdictions in virtually approving a limitless right
to photograph and fingerprint the accused before trial. For subsequent action
In same case, see 113 N.J. Eq. 67, 166 Atl. 144 (1933).
105. Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 Atl. 653 (1909). See State v. Claus-
mier, 154 Ind. 599, 57 N.E. 571 (1900).
106. 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906).
107. 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905); 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906).
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victed; and there was no reason to suspect that they would jump
bail and become fugitives from justice. Nevertheless, the inspec-
tor of police had taken their pictures and Bertillion measure-
ments; and was about to place them in the local depository of
criminal records, commonly known as the "Rogues' gallery," and
to forward copies to galleries in other states. Upon proof of the
above facts, the court enjoined any further showing or distribu-
tion of copies of the plaintiff's photographs and measurements.
The Louisiana decisions are commendable in that they af-
ford the innocent person, accused of crime, a much needed pro-
tection from unnecessary humiliation and publicity.08 They are
especially important, for purposes of the present discussion, in
that the court frankly and openly recognized the plaintiff's pure-
ly personal right to "insist on being let alone," and protected the
same by injunction. 10 9 Whether the Louisiana court would con-
sider the use of a beautiful girl's picture for advertising purposes
as a sufficient invasion to justify relief, is not clear. The court
discusses the Roberson case and dismisses it as "remotely analo-
gous,"'110 and "not germane to the subject.""'
The principle of the Itzkovitch decision was approved by the
Michigan court in Miller v. Gillespie."' In that case, the court re-
fused to order the delivery up and cancellation of a card which
merely contained data as to the arrest, appearance and dismissal
of the accused. The court declared that it did not deny the juris-
diction of equity to prevent an invasion of the right of privacy,
but that some record of all arrests was justified and authorized
by law, and did not impute the actual commission of any crime.
108. For a full discussion of this problem and a criticism of those cases
refusing injunctive relief to the innocent person accused of crime, see Bro-
naugh, Right to Take and Retain Photographs, Etc. of Persons Accused of
Crime (1919) 23 Law Notes 48. See Downs v. Swan, 111 Md. 53, 73 Atl. 653, 656
(1909), cited in note 105, supra.
That the plight of the innocent party accused of crime is not always a
pitiable one, is shown by such cases as the Kidwelly poison case, Manchester,
Eng., 1920, where several newspapers offered Mr. Greenwood, the innocent de-
fendant, tempting sums for his "personal reminiscences of the affair." Pound,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 127.
109. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 4S0, 39 So. 499, 500 (1905). Breaux,
C.J., declares, "There is a right in equity to protect a person from such an
invasion of private rights. Every one who does not violate the law can insist
upon being let alone (the right of privacy)." The court then points out that
an innocent person "may obtain an injunction to prevent his photograph
from being sent to the rogues' gallery. He has a personal right to the re-
straining order. .. "
110. Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 706, 42 So. 227, 228 (1906). Breaux,
C.J., expressed a doubt whether there was any substantial injury to the beau-
tiful girl seeking relief in the Roberson case.
111. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 483, 39 So. 499, 501 (1905).
112. 196 Mich. 423, 163 N.W. 22 (1917).
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It is not surprising that, in Owen v. Partridge,113 the New
York court refused relief in a situation similar to that piesented
in the Itzkovitch and Schulman cases. Although conceding that
the police department had no right to photograph and measure
one merely accused of crime, and that the injury to plaintiff's
reputation .and character might be irreparable, the court followed
the Roberson case for the proposition that the right of privacy
neither has any existence in law nor is enforceable in equity.
The Georgia court applied the rule of the Pavesich case to a
new situation in Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital,"4 where it en-
joined the publication of a picture of plaintiff's child which had
been born with its heart outside its body. The right to relief was
based upon the humiliation and mental anguish suffered by the
parents, and publication of the photograph was held to be a tres-
pass upon their right of privacy. Two judges dissented, arguing
from a dictum statement in the Pavesich decision, that the cause
of action was only in the person photographed. Thus, the child,
if living, would have a right to sue, but the parents had no right
of action.
In essence, the question is-does the right of privacy include
a right to be free from the humiliation and mental anguish which
may result from undesirable publicity given to a deceased child,
husband or other near relative. In granting damages to a parent
for the unauthorized sale of photographs of the nude corpses of
twins, born joined together, the Kentucky court pointed out that
if such a right exists as to one's own photograph, it certainly
exists as to the photograph of a dead child, for "The most tender
affections of the human heart cluster about the body of one's dead
child.115
113. 40 Misc. 415, 82 N.Y. Supp. 248 (1903). The lack of liberality of New
York decisions led to the enactment of a statute specifically providing that
upon determination of a criminal proceeding in his favor, the accused was
entitled (upon demand) to the return of every photograph, etc., taken by
police officers during the pendency of such action. N.Y. Penal Code, § 379a,
N.Y. Laws 1907, c. 626. Even then the New York court refused relief where
plaintiff had "mistaken his remedy" and applied for a writ of mandamus to
compel the destruction of photographs and records wrongfully taken. Gow v.
Bingham, 57 Misc. 66, 107 N.Y. Supp. 1011 (1907).
114. 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930), noted in (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 175,
and (1931) 11 B. U. L. Rev. 143.
115. Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912), noted in (1913) 26
Harv. L. Rev. 275. The defendant was a photographer employed to take a
photograph of the nude corpses of plaintiff's twin boys, and had expressly
agreed not to make additional photographs. The decision was bottomed on
the theory that the making and sale of extra copies constituted a breach of
contract and abuse of confidence. The court relied on Pollard v. Photographic
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Although surviving relatives have no property right in the
corpse of a deceased,"' and in many instances do not own the lot
or monument,1 17 an injunction has uniformly issued to prevent
the desecration of a grave.1" 8 In such instances the court is pro-
tecting a personal right of those closely related to the deceased.
Certainly such injury to feelings by desecration of a grave, is no
more substantial than the mental anguish suffered by the unfor-
tunate parents in the Bazemore case. Where the surviving rela-
tives of a famous man or beautiful girl seek to prevent the use of
a name or picture for advertising purposes, a closer case is pre-
sented, and previous decisions may preclude relief in some juris-
dictions." 9
Probably the most significant extension of the "right of pri-
vacy" comes in two fairly recent decisions. In the Kentucky case
of Brents v. Morgan"20 a doctor sought damages for the "great
mental pain, humiliation and mortification" caused by the publi-
cation of a large sign charging him with being a deadbeat. The
petition did not state a cause of action for libel since the assertion
was true;' 2' but the court held that it stated a good cause of action
for violation of the right of privacy, which "is generally recog-
nized as the right to be let alone, that is, the right of a person to
Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888) where, under similar circumstances, such unau-
thorized action was restrained by injunction.
116. Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422 (1881); Finney v. Atlantic Transport
Co., 220 N.Y. 249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917). In Sherrard v. Henry, 88 W. Va. 315, 106
S.E. 705 (1921) and in Snyder v. Snyder, 60 How. Pr. 368 (N.Y. 1880), the
court held that since there was no property right in a dead body, the common
law afforded no protection and equitable relief was necessary. Occasionally
the court has found a "quasi property right," recognizing the absence of a
property right in the ordinary sense. Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I.
227, 14 Am. Rep. 667 (1872). See Page v. Symonds, 63 N.H. 17, 56 Am. Rep.
481 (1883).
117. Choppin v. LaBranche, 48 La. Ann. 1217, 20 So. 681 (1896), where the
court clearly stated that the plaintiffs had no title, servitude, usufruct or
other sort of property right in the burial place. Accord: Sherrard v. Henry,
88 W. Va. 315, 106 S.E. 705 (1921) (free church burial lot); Page v. Symonds,
63 N.H. 17, 56 Am. Rep. 481 (1883) (dictum, since the defendant's acts were
held to be justified under the circumstances).
118. Choppin v. LaBranche, 48 La. Ann. 1217, 20 So. 681 (1896); Mooney
v. Cooledge, 30 Ark. 640 (1875); Trustees of First Evangelical Church v.
Walsh, 57 Ill. 363, 11 Am. Rep. 21 (1870); Boyce v. Kalbaugh, 47 Md. 334
(1877); Kelly v. Tiner, 91 S.C. 41, 74 S.E. 30 (1912); additional cases are col-
lected in Notes (1922) 21 A.L.R. 651 and (1924) 33 A.L.R. 1432.
119. The early cases refusing relief (note 72, supra) are not necessarily
determinative as to the scope of the "right of privacy," since the courts de-
ciding them refused to recognize such a right.
120. 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927), noted in (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev.
1070; (1927) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 682; (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 835.
121. Ray, Truth, A Defense to Libel (1931) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 43, 51, 52;
Harper, Law of Torts (1933) 523, cases collected in footnote 84.
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be free from unwarranted publicity, or the right to live without
unwarranted interference by the public about matters, with
which the public is not necessarily concerned.' 1 22
In Melvin v. Reid128 the plaintiff had been a prostitute and
had been tried, but acquitted, for murder. Immediately there-
after, she abandoned her life of shame, married, and had ever
since led a virtuous and honorable life. Eight years later the
defendants produced a film, "The Red Kimono," based upon court
records of the plaintiff's unsavory early life. Plaintiff's maiden
name was used therein and the picture was advertised as a true
story of her life. The California court held that plaintiff had a
cause of action for invasion of her purely personal right of pri-
vacy; pointing out that the Constitutional guaranty of the "right
to pursue and obtain happiness" includes a right that a person
may live free from unnecessary attacks on one's character or
reputation.1 24
In both Brents v. Morgan and Melvin v. Reid the court gave
damages for the unwarranted publication of private matters,
which were highly injurious to the individual's peace of mind
and reputation; but, because of their truth, did not amount to
actionable libel. With the recognition and protection of the indi-
vidual's right of privacy in such situations, the way may be
opened up for a wider use of the injunction in preventing defama-
tory publications. Under the historic general rule that "equity
will not enjoin a libel,' 21 5 the defamer is permitted to make his
122. 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967, 969-970 (1927).
123. 297 Pac. 91 (Cal. App. 1931) (action for damages).
124. Id. at 93. Marks, J., emphatically stated that the plaintiff had a
right to continue her present honored status in society without having her
name dragged through the muck of her former depravity "with no other excuse
than the expectation of private gain by the publishers."
Cf. Monson v. Tussauds, [1894] 1 Q. B. 671, 63 L.J.Q.B.N.S. 454, where the
court refused to enjoin the exhibition of a wax model of a person who had
been recently tried and acquitted of murder, placed along with other figures
representing notorious and infamous characters. The court treated the exhi-
bition as a libel, and applied the rule of Bonnard v. Perryman, [1891] 2 Ch.
269, that the court's jurisdiction to enjoin a libel is "of a delicate nature and
ought only to be exercised in the clearest cases." English cases where a libel
has been enjoined are of rather rare occurrence. Note (1937) 10 Australia L.J.
418.
125. State v. Judge of Civil Dist. Ct., 34 La. Ann. 744 (1882); Brandreth v.
Lance, 8 Paige 24 (N.Y. 1839); Singer v. Romerrick, 255 App. Div. 715, 5 N.Y.S.
(2d) 607 (1938), noted in (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1291; Ex parte Tucker, 110 Tex.
335, 220 S.W. 75 (1920). This rule is not based on the absence of property
rights but upon a misconceived application of the fundamental Anglo-Ameri-
can principle of the right of "freedom of speech and the press." However, re-
lief will be granted where the libel is coupled with some independent wrong.
Davis v. New England Ry. Pub. Co., 203 Mass. 470, 89 N.E. 565 (1909); M.
Steinert & Sons Co. v. Tagen, 207 Mass. 394, 93 N.E. 584 (1911) (illegal boy-
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damaging statements, and the injured party is relegated to the
theoretically adequate remedy of a damage action. After being
humiliated and disgraced in the eyes of his friends and asso-
ciates, the libelled party may secure a judgment for such dam-
ages as a jury may assess, and then try to collect it from the often
impecunious wrongdoer.126 In protecting the individual's right
to be free from the humiliation of unnecessary and distasteful
publicity (right of privacy) rather than his reputation only
(libel), the court may shake free from the old shackles which
have limited injunctive relief. Of course there is still the prop-
erty right requirement, but if the court desires to issue an in-
junction it can go through the usual motions of finding such an
interest. Where the court has refused relief it has either been
because it adopted the view of the Roberson case that the right
of privacy was not entitled to any judicial recognition, or because
it felt that the defendaht's acts did not constitute an unreason-
able invasion of that right, as in the case where a newspaper was
merely recounting the plaintiff's innocent actions in an incident
of current public interest. 1 27
CONCLUSION
Our judicial craftsmen are not carving in stone, but are fash-
ioning of the plastic materials in an ever changing social order.
Armed with rules formulated to meet the needs of a simple agri-
cultural state, they seek to cope with the legal problems of a
complex industrial state. In many situations current problems
have outgrown the old measurements of the Chancellor's foot,
and rules that were entirely satisfactory in the days of Lord Coke
cott); National Life Ins. Co. v. Myers, 140 Ill. App. 392 (1908) (conspiracy to
injure business); American Matting Co. v. Keitel, 217 Fed. 672 (S.D. N.Y. 1914)
(malicious attempt to induce breach of contracts). The courts have sometimes
gone pretty far to find an independent wrong. Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-
American Publishing Co., 245 Mass. 262, 139 N.E. 655 (1923); Gibraltar Savings
and Building Ass'n v. Isbell, 101 S.W. (2d) 1029 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), noted
in (1937) 16 Tex. L. Rev. 111. In an exceedingly liberal recent decision, Menard
v. Houle, 11 N.E. (2d) 436 (Mass. 1937), the court enjoined a libel affecting
business, though no independent wrong was Involved.
126. For a complete discussion and criticism of the rule, see Pound, supra
note 20.
127. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W. (2d) 972 (1929), noted
in (1929) 18 Ky. L. J. 86. When plaintiff's husband was attacked and stabbed
to death, she heroically sought to defend him. The newspaper printed an ac-
count of the incident together with her picture. In holding that plaintiff had
no cause of action for invasion of her right of privacy, Clay, J., stated, "There
are times, however, when one, whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in
an occurrence of public or general interest. When this takes place, he emerges
from his seclusion, and it is not an Invasion of his right of privacy to publish
his photograph with an account of such occurrence." (18 S.W. (2d) at 973.)
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and Lord Ellesmere, would become instruments of injustice if
strictly applied. Occasionally a rule has been completely repu-
diated. More often the ancient canon has been retained and
adopted to its new surroundings by adroit manipulations and
ingenuous distinctions. The court's decision thus becomes a ra-
tionalization of an instinctive reaction to administer practical
justice. Such pioneering is essential if the law is to keep pace
with the developments. and needs of modem society.
The maxim that "Equity will only protect property rights"
is bottomed on a principle that arose out of, and might well have
passed with, the feudal system-a sort of caste system based on
land holding. Since then the idea that property is the sole source
of human satisfaction and power has given ground on every hand.
Numerous personal interests have emerged and have been ac-
corded legal recognition. Thus it has beqn urged that a maxim so
redolent of obsolete concepts and situations must necessarily lead
to confusion and injustice. Abstract logic supports such an argu-
ment. However, from the standpoint of results, it is of little con-
sequence that courts have employed the usual and more subtle
technique of confession and avoidance, than that of direct repu-
diation.
A bird's-eye reappraisal of the various groupings of decisions
bears out the writer's major premise that the existence or non-
existence of a property right is seldom a controlling considera-
tion.128 It is upon those twin pillars of practicality and desira-
bility that our modern jurisprudence is and should be developing.
Where an injunction has been .denied, the court has often urged
the absence of a property interest. Where relief has been granted,
the court has often felt duty bound to maintain the traditional
illusion of protecting a property right. Most courts hesitate to
admit frankly the superficial nature of the rule that "Equity pro-
tects only property rights," and are even more reluctant to dis-
card it entirely. Is this because of blind adherence to an ancient
shibboleth, or because the maxim serves as a very convenient
argument in those innumerable cases where, for one reason or an-
other, the protection of a personal interest is not expedient?
128. In a few isolated instances an unwary court has been induced to
take the concept too seriously, and an anomalous decision has resulted. Chap-
pell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 AtI. 542 (1896) (see note 48, supra) where relief
was Improperly, refused; Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912)
(see note 64, supra) where relief should have been denied, since there was
no showing of injury to those living, as In the Bazemore case, 171 Ga. 257,
155 S.E. 194 (1930) (see note 114, supra).
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